ALERRT (Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training) After Action Report on Uvalde shooting, part 1:
some salient sections:
ALERRT teaches that first responders’ main priority in an active shooter situation is to first
Stop the Killing and then
Stop the Dying
Changing Circumstances Prior to Assault
As discussed, the situation became static at 11:38:37. Prior to this, at 11:38:11, the UCISD PD Chief called for additional assistance (tactical teams and equipment). The responding officers began treating the situation as a hostage/barricade rather than an active shooter event.
Factors Increasing Exigency
We identified two factors that we believe increased the exigency of the situation and should have prompted officers to execute an immediate action plan. These factors were ongoing gunfire and the presence of injured people.
Gunfire. At 11:40:58, the suspect fired one shot. At 11:44:00, the suspect fired another shot, and finally, at 12:21:08, the suspect fired 4 more shots. During each of these instances, the situation had gone active, and the immediate action plan should have been triggered because it was reasonable to believe that people were being killed.
Injured People. While it is unclear whether the information from 9-1-1 about injured people in the classrooms was being communicated to officers on the inside of the school, at 11:48:18, a UCISD PD officer enters through the west hallway door and states, “She says she is shot,” referring to his wife. The officer was looking at his phone when he relayed the information to the other officers in the hallway. Based on statements, he had received a call from his wife in the room. This statement illustrates officers on scene were aware of at least one injured person in need of assistance.
Factors Increasing Capability
In addition to information that should have increased the exigency of the situation, a variety of factors increased the capabilities of the officers while dealing with these threats. These included breaching tools, shields, tactical operators, and CS gas. Please refer to Figure 8 on page 20 for a detailed timeline of the factors that increased both exigency and officer capability.
Breaching Tools. A UPD officer stated that they had a Halligan at 11:41:30 when asked by dispatch if the doors were locked. This tool was not seen on camera, and if he was referring to the tool being on scene or at the UPD is unclear. A Halligan tool was captured on camera at 12:35:39. A USO deputy arrives on scene with a sledgehammer at 12:47:57. This completed the toolset needed to breach an outward opening door.
Ballistic Shields. The first ballistic shield arrives on scene at 11:52:08. A second ballistic shield arrived at 12:03:51, a third ballistic shield arrived at 12:04:16, and a fourth ballistic shield arrived at 12:20:46. Each ballistic shield afforded first responders additional protection from potential gunfire. We do not have information about the ballistic rating of each shield at this point.
Tactical Operators. While many officers flowed through the scene, the first known tactical operators (i.e., BORTAC) arrived at 12:15:27. BORTAC operators receive extensive training and equipment to respond to barricaded suspects. Additionally, it is common for tactical operations to be turned over to tactical operators upon their arrival; however, it appears that control of tactical operations was not given to the tactical operators on scene.
CS Gas. Between 12:10:17 and 12:14:10, gas masks were passed out and CS gas cannisters and launchers were on scene.
The assault team entered the room at 12:50:03, 1 hour, 11 minutes, and 26 seconds after the first responding officers took static positions. The assault team had keys that could unlock the door. It does not appear that any officer ever tested the doors to see if they were locked. As we described earlier, we do not believe the door to room 111 was locked.
As this section illustrates, there were multiple points in time where the driving force increased through additional gunfire; however, officers did not act on these increases in driving force. Additionally, officers on scene continually received additional equipment and tactical components that increased their capabilities to address the suspect. Ultimately it is unclear why the officers
decided to assault the room at 12:50:03. There was no apparent change in driving force or response capability at this point.
While we do not have definitive information at this point, it is possible that some of the people who died during this event could have been saved if they had received more rapid medical care. In the next part of this AAR, we intend to address that Stop the Dying portion of the response that
occurred following the killing of the suspect.
Additionally, we have noted in this report that it does not appear that effective incident command was established during this event. The lack of effective command likely impaired both the Stop the Killing and Stop the Dying parts of the response. The final part of this AAR will address incident command issues.
en-volve.com
www.oann.com
gab.com
